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on Extremism & Democracy

Newsletter of the ECPR Standing Group on Extremism & Democracy

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The *e-Extreme* is the newsletter of the ECPR Standing Group on *Extremism & Democracy*. For any enquiries about the newsletter and book reviews, please contact the managing editors (ecprextremismanddemocracy@gmail.com).

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STANDING GROUP ANNOUNCEMENTS

Dear *e-Extreme* readers,

We hope you are well, wherever you may be.

Read on for the usual mix of announcements, reports, reviews, and alerts to keep on top of all the recent developments related to ‘extremism and democracy’. This *e-Extreme* issue includes a new section which presents an interview with an expert scholar who comments on contemporary developments in politics on the extremes of the political spectrum.

Please get in touch with your contributions and ideas for the next issue and don’t forget that the ECPR Standing Group on *Extremism & Democracy* has an official Twitter account (@ecpr_ed) where you can follow us for the latest news and updates, calls for papers, and must-read publications.

REGISTER AS AN E&D STANDING GROUP MEMBER

You can join the ECPR Standing Group on *Extremism & Democracy* always free of charge and at the click of a button, via the ECPR website (<https://ecpr.eu/Groups>). If you have not already done so, please register as a member so that our list is up to date and complete.

In order to join, you will need a MyECPR account, which we assume many of you will already have. If you do not have one, you can create an account in only a few minutes (and you need not be from an ECPR member institution to do so). If you are from a non-member institution, we will need to accept your application to join, so your membership status (which you can see via your MyECPR account, and on the Standing Group pages when you are logged in to MyECPR) will be ‘pending’ until you are accepted.

Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to get in touch!

CALL FOR REVIEWERS

e-Extreme is offering scholars the opportunity to review books and articles! If you want to share your review of the latest published books or articles in the field of populism, extremism, and radicalism and have it published in *e-Extreme*, please do not hesitate to get in touch with us via:

ecprextremismanddemocracy@gmail.com.

E&D ROUTLEDGE BOOK SERIES

The Routledge Book Series in *Extremism and Democracy*, which publishes work that lies within the Standing Group's academic scope, covers academic studies within the broad fields of 'extremism' and 'democracy', with volumes focusing on adjacent concepts such as populism, radicalism, and ideological/religious fundamentalism. These topics have been considered largely in isolation by scholars interested in the study of political parties, elections, social movements, activism, and radicalisation in democratic settings. Since its establishment in 1999, the series has encompassed both influential contributions to the discipline and informative accounts for public debate. Works will seek to problematise the role of extremism, broadly defined, within an ever-globalising world, and/or the way social and political actors can respond to these challenges without undermining democratic credentials.

The series was originally founded by Roger Eatwell (University of Bath) and Cas Mudde (University of Georgia) in 1999. The editorial team now comprises Caterina Froio (Sciences Po), Andrea L. P. Pirro (Scuola Normale Superiore), and Stijn van Kessel (Queen Mary University of London). The editors strongly encourage ideas or suggestions for new volumes in the book series, both from established academics and early career researchers.

To discuss any ideas or suggestions for new volumes in this book series, please contact the editors at: ecprextremismanddemocracy@gmail.com.

KEEP US INFORMED

Please keep us informed of any upcoming conferences or workshops you are organising, and of any publication or funding opportunities that would be of interest to Standing Group members. We will post all details on our website. Similarly, if you would like to write a report on a conference or workshop that you have organised and have this included in our newsletter, please do let us know.

Please, also tell us of any recent publications of interest to Standing Group members so that we may include them in the ‘publications alert’ section of our newsletter, and please get in touch if you would like to see a particular book (including your own) reviewed in *e-Extreme*, or if you would like to review a specific book yourself. We are always keen on receiving reviews from junior and senior scholars alike!

Finally, if you would like to get involved in the production of the newsletter, the development of our website, or any of the other activities of the Standing Group, please do get in touch. We are always very keen to involve more and more members in the running of the Standing Group!

UPCOMING EVENTS AND CALLS

WORK WITH US! OPEN CALL FOR E-EXTREME BOOK REVIEW LIAISON

Would you like to always be on top of the most recent book publications in our field, and acquire practical experience with editing? Then we cordially invite you to apply for the position of the book review liaison in e-Extreme!

Book reviews constitute a core part of the e-Extreme newsletter. In the position of the book review liaison, you will work together with e-Extreme's current early career editors (Audrey Gagnon, Lazaros Karavasilis, and Sabine Volk). We are a friendly and relaxed team that is into 'learning by doing'.

The tasks of the e-Extreme book review liaison include:

- a. acquisition of reviewers,
- b. (co-)editing and formatting of the reviews,
- c. liaising with publishers and the acquisition of the books to be reviewed,
- d. liaising between reviewers, e-Extreme editorial board, and publishers.

Please send your expression of interest to ecprextremismanddemocracy@gmail.com as soon as possible, and by 10 May 2024 at the latest. We are looking forward to hearing from you!

ECPR GC 2024

Registration for this year's ECPR general conference is open until 16 May 2024. Don't forget to register and see you in Dublin!

For more information, visit: <https://ecpr.eu/GeneralConference>

EXTREMISM & DEMOCRACY BEST PAPER PRIZE

The Standing Group is happy to announce that the E&D Best Paper Prize is back at this year's ECPR general conference in Dublin! The award is open to early career researchers only, which includes PhD students and those who are within 5 years post-PhD (with possible extensions to take into account career interruptions). The paper must have been presented at the 2024 General Conference as part of an SG panel and should not have been published elsewhere at the time of submission. Selection criteria will be based on originality, rigour, and significance of the research. The recipient of the award will be recognized during the ECPR GC 2025!

An update on the 2023 best paper prize: the jury will convene soon to select the recipient of the award. The jury is composed of Petra Guasti, Stijn van Kessel and Andrea Pirro. Don't miss the announcement of the recipient at ECPR GC 2024!

2024 UPDATE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT LIBRARY

The 2024 update of the “Eclectic, erratic bibliography on the extreme right (in (Western) Europe)”, kindly curated by Kai Arzheimer, is out. As he [writes](#):

With 222 new titles, this is the biggest update ever. It is more than twice the size of last year's update (which had been the biggest until today) and increases the total number of titles by some 18% to 1436 titles. To use the technical term: it is an absolute monster.

Check out the entire library here: <https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/extreme-right-western-europe-bibliography/> - you can even import it directly into your citation programme.

Check here for Kai's analysis of the journals, authors, and focus of the 2024 update: <https://www.kai-arzheimer.com/222-new-pieces-of-research-on-the-radical-right/>

If your name does not feature in the list, do not hesitate to send Kai the titles, links, and possibly pdf's of your work!

LAUNCH OF FARPO DATABASE

The Far-right Protest Observatory (FARPO) is out! FARPO is an interactive platform created by researchers at CEVIPOL/Université Libre de Bruxelles, Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX), Sciences Po and University of Bologna. The observatory provides data on far-right street activism in European countries over the past two decades. It is a formidable resource for research and teaching. For more information, visit: <https://farpo.eu/>.

APACHE PROJECT ON THE FAR RIGHT IN EUROPE

In the run-up to the European elections, E&D steering committee member Léonie de Jonge has cooperated with the Belgian investigative journalism platform Apache to build a website that assesses the state of the far right in EU member states. Together with an all-female expert team, Apache has assembled this (for now) Dutch-language resource which will hopefully soon be available in English. For more information, visit: <https://xrechtseuropa.apache.be/>

2024 NORDIC CONFERENCE ON VIOLENT EXTERMISM

The 6th Nordic Conference on Violent Extremism, organized by the Center for Research on Extremism, will take place on 17-19 June at the University of Oslo! The conference will consist of keynote speeches, paper sessions and panels, and will begin with an excursion to Utøya, one of the two main sites of the terrorist attacks in Oslo on 22 July 2011. If you wish to attend the conference, you can register until 30 April 2024. For more information, visit: <https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/news-and-events/events/2024/ncve2024/index.html>

POPULISM, ANTI-POPULISM, POLARISATION. 8TH POPULISM SPECIALIST GROUP ANNUAL WORKSHOP, 19 - 20 SEPTEMBER 2024, DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE, CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY, BUDAPEST

Contemporary societies are said to be characterised by increasing polarisation on almost every single issue – ranging from science and the vaccines, identity politics and intersectionality, the environment and climate change, truth and freedom of speech, to name but a few. The so-called truth or culture wars constitute the new norm, drawing new political antagonisms that cut across the classic left/right axis. A burgeoning literature suggests that polarisation has pernicious effects, not only on political party systems but also on society and, by extension, democracy. Reflecting the recent populist hype, polarisation is most often associated with populist leaders, parties and discourses that challenge the political and social consensus, mobilising negative affects and forming antagonistic partisan identities that transgress the established norms of liberal democracies.

However, polarisation is not a new political feature, nor is it necessarily intrinsic to the populist phenomenon as antagonism and conflict are seen as inseparable parts of the political. The same goes for political emotions – a core dimension of political conflict that has always been met with suspicion. While the role of populists in the politics of polarisation has been extensively studied, the role of anti-populists has been largely overlooked. This blind spot is significant, as understanding polarisation as a relational dynamic implies, by definition, that anti-populism also plays a prominent role in this divide.

We welcome critical and reflexive contributions that interrogate the dynamic between populist and anti-populist polarisation, and more broadly explore the rise of the polarisation narrative and how it can be connected to discourses on populism as an alleged threat to democracy. A non-exhaustive list of topics can be found below:

- Critical perspectives on populism, anti-populism and polarisation
- Populist/anti-populist polarisation across time and space

- The role political elites play in polarisation and the impact they have on democracy
- The relationship between conflict and democracy, and its interconnection with populism
- Nuanced understandings of political affects/emotions that go beyond their stereotypical demonisation
- Antagonism as an intrinsic aspect of collective identification
- Contrasting constructions of 'common sense' as a source of antagonism
- Converging and diverging antagonism (e.g. class, people-centric politics, nationalism)
- The role the internet-sphere, memes, humour and technology play in polarisation between populists and anti-populists

Please submit a 250-word abstract by 17 May 2024 using the form on the website (<https://www.psapopulism.org/home>)

Applicants will be notified by 28 June 2024. We aim to provide feedback to those whose abstract is rejected.

The workshop is free of charge. However, applicants should make their own arrangements for transport and accommodation.

INTERVIEW WITH AN EXPERT

THE POLISH ELECTIONS IN OCTOBER 2023 AND THEIR AFTERMATH

Interview with Dr. Natasza Styczyńska, Assistant Professor in the Department of Society and Cultural Heritage of Europe, Jagiellonian University in Kraków

1. To what extent has the far right been normalized in Poland during the PiS government?

For the last 30 years (since the democratic transition), the Polish political arena has shifted to the right. This shift is connected to the experience of functioning within the Soviet sphere of influence and the peculiar communist ‘taboo’, leading to a lack of support towards left-wing parties. Interestingly, not a single left-wing party was represented in the Polish parliament, the *Sejm*, in its 2015-2019 term. At the same time, Polish society endorses certain social policies and supports the welfare state, which enables political movements that mix social economy with traditionalist and nationalist value orientation (and dignity-oriented rhetoric) to flourish.

During the two terms of the Law and Justice (PiS) led coalition government, the cleavage between progressive and nationalistic value-orientation became more evident and was utilised by both sides. The United Right coalition (in power 2015-2023) was never internally coherent, and one could observe many fractions struggling to influence and impact policymaking. The radical right—represented by Solidarity Poland (led by Zbigniew Ziobro)—as well as Confederation presented themselves as the only genuine right-wing party, consequently leading to the normalisation of a radical right agenda (including xenophobic, anti-Semitic, homophobic, and anti-EU attitudes).

The increasing dominance of right-wing parties, as well as policy (abortion ban, limitation of the independence of judiciary, anti-LGBT campaign), has led to an even greater polarisation of the Polish political scene and Polish society. Paradoxically, in the last couple of years, this trend also strengthened progressive/left-wing parties, observed mainly before the 2023 elections. This does not mean that the radical right is in retreat; Confederation may not have received as many votes as it wanted but one should still remember that they managed to gain 1.5 million votes. Similarly, PiS, while failing to form a government, still obtained the biggest share of votes, which is, among other things, a consequence of the normalisation of their right-wing rhetoric.

2. Why did PiS fail to gain a governing majority in the Polish general election in October 2023?

We should take a look at a set of factors that have led to this result. One reason is the weariness of the rhetoric of a ‘besieged fortress’. Building a narrative on fear

obviously has a mobilising effect, but it is not very long-lasting. Another factor, maybe the most important, is the economy: inflation, unfavourable climate for entrepreneurs, corruption scandals, and neglecting public finances. It seems, however, that worldview issues also played an important role, especially among young voters for whom the ban on abortion and education reform led to mobilisation.

I would like to note that PiS's core electorate did not decrease, but the election results were influenced by young (often first-time) voters. Indeed, there may have been a generational change, as for the first time in history, the turnout among the 60+ age group (which has traditionally been favourable to PiS) was lower than in the 18-29 age group. We can also observe a great mobilisation around women, and their choice seems to confirm the gender gap theory, which states that women are less likely to vote for the radical right.

3. What are the specific challenges for the new, liberal government in following up on a right-wing government (e.g. with regard to PiS's domination of the media, the juridical system, etc.)?

This is the most interesting part of the current state of play. The main issue that was discussed before the elections was how to restore democracy and reverse the unconstitutional reforms by democratic means, and how to do it in a relatively short space of time. In this respect, not only democracy is at stake, but also Poland's economic prosperity, as EU funds allocated for Poland, which were blocked due to the conflict with the European Commission over the rule of law, have now been released, but only on the condition of implementing reforms.

All these challenges need to be understood in the context of a turbulent political environment. They are not only contested by the biggest opposition party in the *Sejm*, but also by Andrzej Duda, the president, who does not hide his sympathy towards PiS (his former party). Reforms should not only be rapid, but also transparent and accompanied by public debate, which is no easy task in such a polarised society.

4. What will be the future of far-right politics in Poland these next few years with PiS in opposition?

In my opinion, the radical right is unlikely to fade away, nor will it become a fringe or marginal phenomenon. What fuels the right wing nowadays is the war in Ukraine and the unstable international environment. The main question is how much will democratic forces be able to counteract (Moscow-inspired) anti-Western and anti-EU rhetoric? We have seen since the Russian invasion that some actors strengthened their anti-immigrant rhetoric—mainly anti-Ukrainian, but also Islamophobic and antisemitic. A few days ago, on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Russian attack on Ukraine, a nationalist rally was organised in Warsaw and the main arguments were 'Pol-Exit' and the need for an urgent stop to Poland's support for Ukraine. While it wasn't a huge gathering, it was well-advertised and reported in all mainstream media.

When it comes to international relations, we can expect that the growing importance of the radical right may affect relations with neighbours, the EU, as well as NATO. It is worth noting that Confederation is currently the only party in the *Sejm* that contests economic and military assistance to Ukraine and also demands zero support for Ukrainian refugees in Poland. The European Parliament elections in June 2024 will be a test for the radical right all around Europe, including in Poland—they will show whether we are actually dealing with a fundamental change in voters' preferences and whether the radical right will be finally able to build a coherent block in the European Parliament.

That said, the condition of the economy also plays an important role in the future of far-right politics in Poland. Indeed, if the economic situation improves, a part of the electorate may stop supporting radical right-wing parties.

5. To what extent will PiS's loss of power influence other European far-right actors?

This is an interesting question because, on the one hand, it seems that PiS is still a significant player in the European arena, especially within the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group in the European Parliament, and, on the other hand, it is clear that Poland's example (i.e. the possibility of reversing illiberal reforms and returning to democracy) has been noted by countries that also have a problem with a growing radical right.

It is difficult, however, to answer this question as we do not yet know how PiS will redefine itself: Will it focus on a new leadership or will Jarosław Kaczyński remain the party leader? As I mentioned, it is not an ideologically coherent party; some of its politicians feel good in the ECR group, but some are ideologically closer to the Identity and Democracy (ID) group. The coming months should show us in which direction the party is evolving.

The same will happen with Confederation. Before the election, this very diverse coalition party tried to present itself as moderate-right in the media, keeping silent about its controversial slogans (e.g. the so-called Five Points of Confederations; the programme statement from the EP campaign in 2019: we do not want Jews, homosexuals, abortion, EU taxes). I believe that they could still obtain around 10% of public support if they stick to economically libertarian and neo-traditionalist positions. If Confederation decides to allow far-right rhetoric (as presented by infamous PM Grzegorz Braun, recently known for an antisemitic incident – dousing menorah with a fire extinguisher during celebrations of Hanukkah in Sejm), the support may not reach over 5% (as already happened in the past with the Congress of the New Right).

6. In the light of recent developments in your field, what are the questions that we should focus from now on?

Research on the radical and extreme right show that they have entered the mainstream and we already know a lot about both the demand and supply-side of these phenomena. For me, personally, there are two interconnected areas in

which more research would be welcome. One of them is the concept of democracy, as we are mostly dealing with a populist radical right, which claims an attachment to democracy and representing the will of the people—however, this is a specific, majoritarian version of democracy. If this version of democracy becomes mainstream, it will have consequences not only for internal politics but also for the future of the European Union.

The second issue, indirectly related to the first, is the vision of the EU in the future. Research shows that only a marginal number of parties argues for exiting or abandoning European integration; the majority of radical right parties claim that "a different Europe is possible". For me, this vision of change of the EU is extremely interesting. It is true that radical right parties have so far not managed to develop a common programme, but there is a platform for cooperation (which resulted in meetings of right-wing parties in Budapest, Warsaw, and Madrid) and there are more and more issues around which cooperation would be possible. Researchers could focus on answering the question of what this alternative vision of Europe proposed by radical right parties would look like and what it means for the future of the EU.

BOOK REVIEW

GIORGOS VENIZELOS. "POPULISM IN POWER: DISCOURSE AND PERFORMATIVITY IN SYRIZA AND DONALD TRUMP."

ROUTLEDGE, 2023. 262 PP. £120. ISBN: 9781032397177.

Panos Panayotu
Aarhus University, Denmark

What does populism look like in power? Is it the fate of populist parties to succeed in opposition but fail in government? Is populism responsible for the capacity (or incapacity) of populist actors to implement policy after winning elections? As populist parties increasingly participate in governments these questions become critical and central in academic debates on populism. To be sure, mainstream media and academics eagerly denounce any populist attempt in government to confirm their, often deterministic, arguments that populism always fails when exercising governmental power. The debacle of the first Syriza Government in the summer of 2015, that Cas Mudde labelled as the 'failure of the populist promise' (2017), serves as such an example. In his book *Populism in Power: Discourse and Performativity in SYRIZA and Donald Trump*, Giorgos Venizelos invites us to avoid such reductionist views while tackling the pressing question of how populism manifests in power.

In doing so, Venizelos offers an anti-essentialist framework that allows one to detach this phenomenon from specific outcomes or overpromising and demagogic tendencies – trends that are dominant in most of the studies of populism in power (see e.g., Canovan 1999: 12; Mény and Surel 2002: 18; see also Chapter 1: 17-24). By drawing upon the Essex School of Discourse Analysis the author proposes instead to place the emphasis on the core components of populism: people-centrism and anti-elitism. More specifically, from a discursive point of view, populism is defined as a political logic that links unsatisfied demands into a common chain producing a popular identity, 'the people', which is juxtaposed to the elite(s). Venizelos combines the discursive approach with the sociocultural and performative approaches to underline that populists construct 'the people' by *doing* politics in a particular way (Chapter 1: 28-31). He also highlights the critical role of affect in this process (Chapter 1: 31-5). As such, he argues that the analysis of populist actors in government should center on the perpetuation or adoption of the populist schema and the fading or strengthening of the populist identification while holding governmental positions (Chapter 1: 35-7).

The theoretical contribution of Venizelos' approach is crucial as it allows us to observe more clearly two potential functions of populism: in opposition and in government. On the one hand, populism is an attempt to build a counter-hegemonic project by articulating a set of demands and actors into a *chain of equivalence* and constructing, in that way, *a people* that is held together by a shared opposition to the establishment. On the other hand, once a populist project

attains a degree of power and hegemony by entering the government, populism can be used to maintain that degree of power by actively sustaining the affective bond between ‘the people’ and the populist leader/party. This is where things become more complicated as exercising governmental power involves ‘administration and the individualisation of social demands’ (Laclau 2005: 45). This, in a nutshell, is what Laclau calls *the logic of difference* that prevails in *institutionalist* politics, which is seen as the antithetical pole of populism. The work of Venizelos in his book draws attention to the complexities of populism in power where the *populist* logic of equivalence and the *institutionalist* logic of difference interact in dynamic and unexpected ways. No doubt that such interaction is risky for populist actors in government as the populist identification might dissolve. In my view, this is a critical contribution to the discursive approach that might open the road for further exploration and theorisation of the *populist governing logic*.

In the empirical part of the book, Venizelos focuses on the comparative examination of what he considers as two paradigmatic cases of left- and right-wing populism in power in recent years: Syriza in Greece and Trump in the US. After outlining the socio-political context in Greece and the US that gave rise to Syriza and Trump (Chapter 2), Venizelos offers a rich analysis based on a combination of discourse analysis of speeches, manifestoes, campaigning videos, posters, and social media content with semi-structured interviews with supporters and party elites as well as participant observation during certain organised events. His study covers a timeframe that follows the journey of Syriza and Trump from opposition to government (Chapters 3-6).

The analysis of Syriza’s discourse sheds light on the construction of ‘the people’ while in opposition as a heterogeneous and pluralistic subject. In Venizelos’ words, ‘the people’ is understood as ‘politically subaltern and socially excluded’ (Chapter 3: 87). The author shows how Syriza remained populist when in government, albeit to a greater or lesser extent depending on the broader context each time: from the ‘in office, but not in power’ narrative during the first six months of the first Syriza Government in 2015 to various articulations of populism with other non-populist or even anti-populist elements, after the July Referendum of 2015 and the party’s capitulation. This evolution culminated in a peculiar form of ‘populism without “the people”’ (Chapter 4: 126) as the latter felt disillusioned by the abandonment of the anti-austerity commitments of Syriza.

Now, the analysis of Trump (Chapters 5 & 6) brings to the fore strong nativist, xenophobic, and authoritarian elements that, as Venizelos himself recognises, prevail in his discourse and performative style (e.g., Chapter 6: 128). The author also indicates that ‘the people’ in this case is clearly constructed in ethno-nationalist terms (Chapter 7: 192), while out-groups are mostly targeted (e.g., Chapter 5: 138). If what we really have here is a nativist and right-wing authoritarian case, does it deserve to be labelled as populist or as *a paradigmatic case of right-wing populism*? Venizelos seems to justify this by adopting the ‘triadic’ schema of Judis (2016:15), according to whom right-wing populism looks at the same time upward and ‘down upon an out group’. This *triadic* structure implies an articulation of populism with nativism. However, these two distinct discursive logics do not manifest in the same degree and as Venizelos shows in his analysis, in the case of Trump it is clearly the nativist logic that prevails. Doesn’t that make Trump a case of nativism –*rather than populism*– in power? This might also explain

the enduring passionate identification of the (ethno-nationalist) people with Trump (Chapter 7: 204), which builds upon very strong pre-existing narratives and symbols that accompany *the nation*.

In conclusion, Venizelos' *Populism in Power* significantly advances our understanding of populism's manifestations in government, offering valuable insights for future research in this field. On the theoretical level, the book challenges the prevailing narratives about populism in power urging for a deeper exploration of its adaptability and dynamic interplay with non- and anti-populist elements when confronted with the realities of governing. On the empirical level, it offers an insightful analysis of the discursive strategies, performativity and emotional appeals employed by Syriza and Trump in their attempt to foster and then sustain the identification of 'the people' with them. A critical objection can be raised against the alleged populist character of Donald Trump as Venizelos' analysis illuminates how nativist and authoritarian elements significantly overshadow populism. I advocate for a more robust and stronger stance of scholars that study populism to avoid the euphemisation of far-right leaders like Trump – indeed, the term 'populism' can be a gift to such leaders (see Mondon and Yates 2024). To be fair, other published works by the author (see e.g., Venizelos 2021) points us in that direction, so it came as a surprise that Trump was treated as a paradigmatic case of right-wing populism throughout the book. Nonetheless, Venizelos' nuanced approach make *Populism in Power* a compelling read and a vital point of reference for anyone seeking to understand the complexities of populism in government.

Panos Panayotu is a post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Global Studies and the DEMINOVA research project at Aarhus University. His research focuses on discourse analysis, populism, transnationalism and social movements. His work has appeared in *Political Studies*, the *Journal for the Study of Radicalism* and collective volumes with established academic publishers.

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PUBLICATIONS ALERT

Our publication alert is based on a semi-automated search and can never be complete. Therefore, please tell us about any **recent** publications of interest to Standing Group members so that we may include them in our newsletter.

Adam, A., & Tsavou, E. (2024). Assessing the effect of international terrorism on civil liberties using a potential outcomes framework. *Public Choice*.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01149-1>

Ammassari, S. (2024). Deterrent or Stimulus? How Perceived Societal Stigma Affects Participation in Populist Radical Right Parties. *Political Studies*.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217241234527>

Angelucci, D., Carrieri, L., & Conti, N. (2024). Party-Based Sovereignism in EU Countries: Main Patterns and Their Justification. *Government and Opposition*.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2023.47>

Angelucci, D., Rojon, S., & Vittori, D. (2024). Do populist parties promote direct democracy? An empirical assessment in 29 countries in the last two decades. *Contemporary Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2023.2296748>

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
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